Literacy as a Legislative and Judicial trope tabetha adkins-texas a&m university-commerce Literacy itself can be understood only in its social and political context, and that context, once the mythology has been stripped away, can be seen as one of entrenched class structure in which those who have power have a vested interest in keeping it.
and opinions since 1915 for terms like literacy, reading, and writing. Most cases that referenced or involved literacy were focused on voting rights, literacy tests for voting, and challenges to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which banned literacy tests as a requirement for voting. This analysis revealed trends: before the Voting Rights Act, literacy was deployed as autonomous and neutral; after the VRA, literacy is characterized in ways that call to mind Scribner's metaphor of "literacy as power, "
suggesting an ideological understanding of literacy. I turn to this analysis now and conclude with what these legal understandings might mean post-Shelby, following challenges to the Voting Rights Act.
tHe earLy years: LIteracy tests aNd tHe supreme court, 1915 and 1959 The first record of literacy tests as a topic of debate in the SCOTUS appears in the 1915 decision on Guinn v. United States. The issue at hand in this case was the use of the "Grandfather Clause, " a rule employed by many states, in this case Oklahoma, that waived the literacy test requirement for anyone whose grandfather had voted. The Court was asked to consider, first, whether Oklahoma's amendment responsible for creating the Grandfather Clause was valid, and second, whether the Amendment was created in order to deny rights to African Americans who were otherwise qualified to vote. The Court unanimously found this clause to be unconstitutional and ruled against it, even though, as historian J. Morgan Kousser shows, this move was not "particularly progressive" and "had no practical effect" (142) . States like Oklahoma were able, Kousser argues, to continue "administrative discrimination without further legal challenge, " and most states' Grandfather Clauses had expired by the time of the Court's decision in 1915 (142) . Chief Justice Edward D. White, the son of a slaveholding sugar farmer and a former Confederate soldier and prisoner of war from Louisiana, wrote the Court's majority opinion. In the opening paragraph, White writes that officers of the State of Oklahoma . . . conspired unlawfully, willfully, and fraudulently to deprive certain negro citizens, on account of their race and color, of a right to vote at a general election held in that State in 1910, they being entitled to vote under the state law, and which right was secured to them by the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In other words, White argues that the literacy test was used as a tool to deny the rightful vote to citizens. In a democratic society, of course, a citizen exercises power through voting. We can understand White's language through Denny Taylor's reminder that "if you have power and privilege in society, literacy can be used to maintain your social status. You can use print to your advantage and to the disadvantage of others" (10). Justice Douglas's words illustrate a point Kate Vieira makes in her LiCS symposium article "On the Social Consequences of Literacy" that literacy can be seen as "a navigational technology that opens up some paths and closes off others, that orients and disorients, that routes and often reroutes" (27). Vieira further explains that literacy can serve as an "obstacle" and often "oppresses, disenfranchises, [and] regulates " (28) .
There are three distinctive kinds of literacy tests that were designed to limit voting access:
tests that measured knowledge of civics or government, tests of character, and tests designed to be failed. 1 , 1957-70" shows that during this era being "of good moral character" was often used as an exception or alternative for the literacy tests mostly "to ensure that illiterate whites were not disenfranchised " (480) . Similarly, there are five different questions about employment.
According to voting laws prior to the 1965 VRA, employment is similarly a measurement of "good character" and entitlement to voting, and this philosophy is reflected in Mississippi's application for registration. This requirement is consistent with Graff 's description of the belief "that education could prevent criminality, if not cure it, and was integral" (Literacy 235). This concept of tying literacy to morality reflects what Graff calls "the moral bases of literacy" which is related to what Graff describes as "the moral economy, " or a society in which literacy is considered a resource that a nation needs to "increase its material prosperity" (Literacy 25).
The final category of literacy tests is the category designed to be failed. The state of Texas, for example, famously required applicants to answer one question: how many bubbles are in a bar of soap? Similarly, Louisiana's 1963 Louisiana's -1964 test, archived by the CRMV, requires applicants to follow instructions such as "In the space below, write the word "noise" backwards and place a dot over what would be its second letter should it have been written forward" and "Place a cross over the tenth letter in this line, a line under the first space in this sentence, and a circle around the last the in the second line of this sentence. " Again, applicants were expected to complete this test in ten minutes and were not permitted to miss a single question. The confusing nature of the questions plus the strict time limit indicates that the writers of this test did not intend for it to be passed. tHe VotING rIGHts act oF 1965
Literacy is defined indirectly in the VRA through descriptions of literacy tests. Section four explicitly addresses the implementation of literacy tests, stating that "no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State. " "Test or device" is later defined in subsection C as any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or member of any other class.
In subsection E, the Act states that as long as a potential voter has completed sixth grade in an established school in U.S. territory, even if the instruction in that school was not in English, that voter cannot be subjected to a literacy test.
In both of these subsections of the Act, the phrase used to describe the tests' intentions, and I argue to define literacy, is "read, write, understand, or interpret. " This definition seems to privilege what is often referred to as "functional literacy" and can be defined, again as Scribner does, as "the level of proficiency necessary for effective performance in a range of settings and customary activities" (9). The writers of the Voting Rights Act seemed to operate under the assumption that if functional literacy can be tested, the test is not one to which a rightful citizen should be subjected. the VRA in two ways: first, the fact that the VRA exists at all is a reflection of the ideological model, which he says "enables us to focus on the ways in which the apparent neutrality of literacy practices disguises their significance for the distribution of power in society " (431) . Second, Street's autonomous model helps us understand the VRA's language, which treats literacy as "independent of social context, an autonomous variable whose consequences for society and cognition can be derived from its intrinsic character " (432) . In other words, the definition of literacy in the VRA ignores the social context of literacy, which is important for defining and understanding what literacy is. The contradictory nature of the existence of the act and the language used in the act illustrates how complicated it is to legislate issues of literacy. This contradiction, it seems, can be seen in how the SCOTUS interpreted literacy in the cases that followed the VRA. [Georgia] the evidence is that in the memory of no witness has any black person ever been unable to pass the literacy test. " One justice (unidentified in the transcripts) challenged this claim, asking how many "negroes" had been elected to office in Burke County, to which Leverett had to admit "zero. "
Clearly, the justices in 1982 were unwilling to accept the idea that literacy tests were fair and enforced a conception of the tests as bureaucratic injustice, what we might call "literacy violence. "
Legal cases have continued to invoke the injustices of literacy testing. In Thornburg v. Gingles, a 1986 case concerning voting and racial justice, attorney for the plaintiff Julius Chambers used the word "problems" to describe a situation in which literacy tests were used illegally in districts to intimidate potential African American voters despite the passing of the VRA. In the 1996 case Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, the issue in question included the practice of holding a convention that required a $45 fee instead of a primary election. Justice Stephen Breyer compared this practice to literacy tests, asserting that in both cases, "only the white people can vote. " In other words, the fee would serve as a deterrent for poor or minority registrants. In the 2000 age-discrimination case What these cases illustrate is that even in instances when literacy was not the subject of inquiry, the literacy test stands as a symbol that is rhetorically persuasive enough to use in the important arguments made in the SCOTUS, and this shift was a result of the VRA. Following the passing of the VRA, representatives of the court began to characterize literacy tests in ways that call to mind Scribner's metaphor of "literacy as power"-those with power using literacy to prohibit others from gaining power. The justices' use of this new trope of literacy tests as discriminatory suggest they understood that literacy was used as a kind of violence-a way to prohibit citizens Breyer tried to reframe this issue by comparing discriminatory voting practices to a plant disease.
In his comparison, literacy tests were simply a symptom of the disease and he argues, "the disease is still there in the State. " Although Attorney Rein attempted to push back, arguing that the needs do not justify the current burden of preclearance on specified districts, Breyer argued that "by and large (this statute) has worked" to create fairness in voting laws. Literacy tests were used to identify districts for preclearance status, but since literacy tests were outlawed by the VRA, opponents of preclearance argue that historic uses of literacy tests is no longer a relevant mechanism to determine singled-out districts.
Justice Breyer's characterization of literacy testing is consistent with that used in the SCOTUS in the years following the VRA. Breyer and the three justices who voted with him seem to characterize the literacy test as shorthand for discrimination. However, Breyer was in the minority. The other five justices see the VRA, as Justice Antonin Scalia referred to it, as a "racial entitlement" and violation of states' rights. This historic decision-and what Congress will do in response-serves as a culmination of the way in which literacy has been constructed and used as trope in judicial debates about voting rights.
It may be that the VRA's contradictory characterization of literacy, blending Street's autonomous and ideological models, contributed to the recent shift in the court's characterization of literacy tests and the VRA. More broadly, I suspect we are in the midst of a shift in our cultural attitudes regarding literacy in the United States. Graff reminds us of "the pervasive power of the literacy myth in American culture and politics, " and this myth seems to be as powerful as ever ("Legacies" 16) . Given that the United States, which functions under what Graff refers to as a "knowledge economy, " is still emerging from The Great Recession, is it a coincidence that attitudes toward literacy, literacy tests, and access are shifting? After all, as Graff maintains, "[t] he … needs of a 'knowledge economy, ' we easily forget, do not bring employment and rewards to all those in search of fair work and pay, regardless of their ability to read and write across different media and different languages" ("Legacies" 16) . When it comes to employment, access, education, and voting rights in the United States, investments are deep. This sense of exigence contributes to the further politicization of literacy, already highly politicized through the literacy myth. We must consider this history of literacy's conceptualization and use as a trope throughout modern American history so that we fully realize what is at stake when Congress responses to the SCOTUS Shelby County decision. And what is at stake? Access, equality, fairness, and the further perpetuation of the literacy myth to maintain power for those who are already successful in the knowledge economy.
